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Abstract
WTI and Brent crude oil futures are competing pricing benchmarks and they jockey for the
number one position as the leading futures market. The price spread between WTI and Brent
is also an important benchmark itself as the spread affects international trade in oil, refiner
margins, and the price of refined products globally. In addition, the shapes of the WTI and
Brent futures curves reflect supply and demand fundamentals in the U.S. versus the world
market, respectively.
On the analysis of the relationship between the two futures prices, we identify a
structural break in the WTI–Brent price spread in January 2011 and a break in the corre-
sponding shapes of the futures curves around the same time. The structural break was a
consequence of a dramatic rise in U.S. production due to fracking, a series of supply dis-
ruptions in Europe, binding storage constraints, and the U.S. crude oil export ban. These
events are studied in the context of a simulation model of world oil prices. We reproduce
the stylized facts of the oil market and conclude that the 2011 break in pricing structure was
consistent with standard commodity storage theory.
Keywords: crude oil futures, commodity storage, WTI, Brent, competitive storage model
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1. Introduction1
The crude oil futures market is dominated by two competing benchmark grades,2
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent crude. As benchmarks, WTI and Brent provide a3
reference price against which oil around the world is traded at a premium or discount. WTI4
is primarily traded on the NYMEX (CME Group) while Brent is primarily traded on the5
Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The CME Group and ICE both cross list WTI and Brent.6
However, the CME accounts for over 80% of WTI volume and the ICE accounts for about7
90% of the Brent trading volume.8
The pricing point for WTI is delivery into either a pipeline or storage facility in9
Cushing, Oklahoma. Brent crude specifies delivery onto a vessel at the Sullom Voe oil termi-10
nal on the Shetland Islands in the North Sea. The chemical characteristics of Brent and WTI11
are nearly identical, with Brent crude being the slightly less sulfurous of the two. Annual12
trading volume for each of the contracts is displayed in Figure 1 where it is shown that for13
three recent years (2012-2014) Brent displaced WTI as the most heavily traded oil futures14
market. During this time period, the U.S. government’s Energy Information Administra-15
tion (EIA) abandoned WTI for its reference oil price, and substituted the North Sea Brent16
contract, in its 2013 Annual Energy Outlook. The reasoning was that WTI was somewhat17
disconnected from the global market. At the time Brent was a superior benchmark because18
imported crude into the eastern and western U.S. coastal markets and refined products in the19
U.S. are priced off the global market. But shifting to Brent as a reference price was not ideal20
because oil production in the North Sea is dwindling due to aging oil fields in that region.21
Crude oil sold in the U.S. is priced off the WTI contract, while oil sold internationally22
is typically priced off Brent. Therefore the spread between the two is a very important metric23
in the global oil complex. The spread reflects the competitiveness of U.S. in the world market24
and in addition the WTI–Brent price spread is an indicator of refiner profitability in the U.S.25
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Figure 1: WTI and Brent Annual Futures Contract Trading Volumes
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Source: https://www.theice.com/marketdata/reports/7 for Brent and Bloomberg for WTI.
versus world market. Refiner profits are impacted by the spread because their input (oil)26
could be benchmarked off WTI (depending on the source) but their output (gasoline or other27
refined products) could be more closely benchmarked to Brent. In this paper we study the28
WTI–Brent price spread and the shapes the futures curves for each of the two contracts. Our29
specific aim is to explain what happened in 2011 when the spread diverged from historical30
levels, sending WTI to more than a $20 discount under WTI and resulting in the WTI being31
viewed as a broken benchmark for a time. At the same, time the shape of the WTI and Brent32
futures curves became dissimilar from one another, with different slopes, which was unusual.33
The Brent and WTI contracts are differentiated in two important ways. The price34
settlement points are separated by over four thousand miles and the delivery specifications35
differ substantially. Brent crude can be readily transported anywhere in the world and thus its36
3
spot price is more correlated with port and coastal grades of crude oil (The Intercontinental37
Exchange, 2013). Alternatively, WTI is more responsive to U.S.-specific supply and demand38
fundamentals and infrastructure issues. Further, the WTI pricing point is co-located with39
substantial above-ground storage, 73 million barrels of storage capacity (EIA, 2016c). The40
Brent location is more of a just-in-time production model with only 8.4 million barrels of41
available storage (Olsen, 2012, BP, 2016). Conceptually, the vastly different storage facilities42
could give rise to alternative inter-temporal price spreads in one market versus the other.43
The law of one price suggests that the spot prices for these nearly equivalent grades of crude44
oil should differ by no more than the transactions costs of transporting oil from one market45
to another. This is why the spot prices were so closely linked prior to 2011, when the U.S.46
was a major net importer of oil (Fattouh, 2010).47
Inter-temporal prices are linked through storage (Working, 1949, Brennan, 1958,48
Wright and Williams, 1982) and spatial prices are linked by trade (Makki, Tweeten and49
Miranda, 1996, Miranda and Glauber, 1995). There have been other cases in the commodities50
space where the law of one price has broken down, but typically, these are short lived events.51
For instance, in early 2014 natural gas prices at the Algonquin citygate hub serving Boston52
reached about $25 per mmBTU compared to $5 per mmBTU in Henry Hub due to pipeline53
capacity constraints (EIA, 2016b). However, this price differential lasted only a matter of54
months compared to the lengthy WTI–Brent differential.55
Figure 2 shows the log relative spot price of WTI and Brent from 1993 to 2016. The56
relative price remained relatively stable from the beginning of the series until some time in57
early 2011 where the relative price sharply falls, indicating a divergence in the spot prices.58
Figure 2 also includes a dashed line at the January 6, 2011 breakpoint which is discussed in59
Section 2.60
Not only did the spot prices diverge in early 2011, but so did the shape of the61
futures curves for both WTI and Brent. We observe a marked difference between inter-62
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Figure 2: Log Relative Price of WTI and Brent Spot Prices
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Note: Log of the ratio of WTI and Brent weekly spot prices. Dashed line indicates January 6, 2011.
Source: Data obtained from United States Energy Information Administration.
temporal futures price spreads for WTI and Brent, shown below in Figure 3. We define63
the inter-temporal price spread for each crude oil grade as the fourth month futures price64
minus the front month price. We choose this measure of inter-temporal price spread to65
yield a three-month time horizon within which trade and storage decisions can be made. We66
observe that in 2011, the price spread for WTI was positive, or in “contango,” and the spread67
for Brent was negative, or in “backwardation.” In the early portion of the sample, these68
contracts exhibit similar price spreads where typically they were either both in contango69
or both in backwardation at any given time. The contango structure of the WTI futures70
curve is indicative of an oversupplied market, that is the market is putting a premium on oil71
delayed for sale in the future. Whereas, the Brent in backwardation indicated the market was72
placing a premium on immediate delivery of oil. Figure 3 shows that, around the same time73
the spot prices diverged, the shape of the futures curves for WTI and Brent also diverged.74
WTI remained in contango and Brent went into backwardation. This divergence of WTI75
and Brent prices led some to question the legitimacy of WTI as the global oil benchmark,76
5
Figure 3: WTI and Brent, Weekly Three-Month Price Spreads
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Note: The three-month price spread is calculated as the futures price for delivery four months in the future
minus the futures price for delivery one month in the future. Dashed line indicates January 6, 2011.
Source: Data obtained from Quandl.com.
suggesting that Brent should take its place (Kilian, 2016). However, Kilian (2016) notes that77
Brent suffers from its own drawbacks such as declining North Sea production leading to low78
liquidity, and the continual broadening of the definition of the Brent benchmark to include79
lower grades of crude. Kilian (2016) wrote that it is “unclear whether there remains enough80
oil in the North Sea to sustain a Brent benchmark in the long run” (p. 33).81
We hypothesize that a series of events, beginning in the late 2000s, led to a situation82
where the combined effect was a break in integrated WTI and Brent markets. The shale83
revolution greatly increased U.S. domestic oil production starting in 2008 (Brown and Yu¨cel,84
2013). A thorough overview of the shale revolution can be found in Kilian (2016) and Alquist85
and Gue´nette (2014). As U.S. production rose, more oil began flowing to Cushing, OK than86
could be refined and then moved via pipeline. Therefore, crude oil stocks in Cushing began to87
climb (Wilmoth, 2012). In March 2011, storage capacity utilization reached 91% in Cushing,88
OK (EIA, 2015).89
6
At the same time, Europe was experiencing negative supply shocks. The Libyan90
Crisis disrupted production and this incident persisted much longer than expected (Meyer,91
2011). Nigerian pipeline sabotage also disrupted supply (Vidal, 2011). In addition, bad92
weather in the North Sea caused production outages (Meyer, 2011). These supply disruptions93
resulted in severe drawdowns of Brent inventories (Blas and Blair, 2011).94
Prior literature has identified the U.S. shale revolution, non-U.S. production disrup-95
tions, U.S. infrastructure and transportation bottlenecks, the U.S. export ban, reweighting96
of the S&P GSCI commodity index in favor of Brent, and the Dow Jones UBS commodity97
index including Brent for the first time, as explanations for the divergence of the WTI and98
Brent prices (Alquist and Gue´nette, 2014, Bu¨yu¨ksahin et al., 2013, Chen, Huang and Yi,99
2015, Kilian, 2016, Ye and Karali, 2016).100
We develop a stylized, simulation model of world oil prices that we parameterize and101
calibrate to represent the characteristics of the crude oil market before the structural break.102
We impose features of the key stylized facts: positive production shocks in the U.S., negative103
production shocks in Europe, maximum and minimum storage constraints, and a U.S. export104
ban. We then simulate the model and compare the results with the characteristics of the105
oil market before and after the structural break. We are able to successfully reproduce the106
structural break in the oil market.107
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present stylized facts of the world108
oil market and we test for and identify a break in cointegration between WTI and Brent daily109
spot prices as well as daily nearby futures prices. In Section 3, we present our hypotheses110
as to why there was a structural break. Next, in Section 4 we develop a stylized model of111
world oil prices based upon the competitive storage model employed by Gustafson (1958),112
Wright and Williams (1982), Deaton and Laroque (1992), and the extensions by Miranda113
and Glauber (1995) and Makki, Tweeten and Miranda (1996) which incorporate trade into114
the model. Section 5 presents the results of our simulation of the model and compares them115
7
to the key stylized facts of the oil market following the structural break. Finaly, Section 6116
concludes.117
2. Stylized facts of the world oil market118
Key stylized facts related to the WTI and Brent markets are shown in Table 1.119
When comparing average data for the three years before the 2011 price break to the average120
for the three years following, U.S. production increased by 43% and North Sea production121
decreased by 29%. Storage levels at the WTI pricing terminal increased by 32% and storage122
levels in OECD Europe declined by 4%.1 Exports from the North Sea to the U.S. declined by123
76% and the average spot price premium for WTI over Brent fell from $0.92 to -$11.18. The124
shape of the forward curve also experienced a shift as the percent of trading days that WTI125
was in contango fell from 90% to 69%, whereas for Brent it fell from 92% to 45%.2 In the126
years following the price break, Brent was in backwardation more often than in contango.127
Futures trading volume in the WTI front month contract fell by 19%, whereas the Brent128
front month (the contract for most immediate delivery) trading volume increased by 61%.129
When linked by trade, the spot prices of WTI and Brent crude should be arbitraged.130
Since the inception of the Brent crude benchmark in 1993 through 2011, this was largely131
true. The 52-week rolling correlation between the weekly spot prices of WTI and Brent are132
presented in Figure 4.3 It is apparent that the correlation between these two price series does133
not deviate much from the mean of 0.96 up until some point in 2011 when the relationship134
broke down. The correlation dropped and remained persistently depressed following the start135
1The ideal measure for Brent storage is storage levels at the Sullom Voe terminal, however, these data
are unavailable. As a proxy, storage levels for OECD Europe as a whole declined between these two time
periods.
2Percent of trading days in contango is measured as the proportion of trading days where the settlement
price for the futures contract four months ahead is greater than the settlement price of the futures contract
one month ahead.
3On a given week, the 52-week rolling correlation calculates the correlation between two series for the past
52 weeks.
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Table 1: WTI and Brent Oil Markets, Stylized Facts
2008 - 2010 2012 - 2014 %∆
Production
U.S. (thousand bbl/day) 5,277 7,546 +43%
North Sea (thousand bbl/day) 3,702 2,650 -28%
Storage
Cushing, OK (thousand bbl) 28,065 37,362 +33%
OECD Europe (thousand bbl) 332,333 317,467 -4%
International Trade
North Sea to U.S. (thousand bbl/day) 140 34 -76%
Prices
WTI-Brent Average Spot Premium $0.92 -$11.18 -1,315%
Percent of Trading Days in Contango
WTI 90% 69% -23%
Brent 92% 45% -50%
Front Month Trading Volume
WTI 285,591 232,665 -19%
Brent 110,570 178,326 +61%
Source: U.S. production data (EIA, 2016f), North Sea production data (EIA, 2016a), Cushing, OK storage
data (EIA, 2016g), and North Sea to U.S. international trade data (EIA, 2016e) are from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration. North Sea production and international trade data are computed as the sum of
country-specific values for Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. OECD
Europe storage data are from the IEA Oil Market Reports for February 2012 and February 2016 (IEA,
2012, IEA, 2016). The WTI-Brent average spot premium is calculated as the difference the WTI spot price
minus the Brent spot price per the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2016d). Percent of trading
days in contango is based on the portion of days where the fourth month futures price exceeds the front
month futures price based on daily futures settle prices for the CME WTI contract and ICE Brent contract
obtained from Quandl.com. Front month trading volume for the CME WTI contract and ICE Brent
contract are based on daily trading volume obtained from Quandl.com.
of 2011. The absolute prices are presented in Figure 5.136
We analyzed the long-term relationship between WTI and Brent series; as they137
were non-stationary4 we tested for cointegration between them using weekly spot prices and138
performing the two-step Engle-Granger test for cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987). We139
suspect that the two price series are cointegrated during the early portion of our sample, but140
the cointegration degrades at some point. To test for a break in the cointegration between141
4We performed the augmented DF-GLS test on the daily spot prices from 1993 to 2016 and found both
series non-stationary (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock, 1992). The DF-GLS test
statistic for WTI was -1.577 and for Brent -1.307, therefore it was not possible to reject the hypothesis of
non-stationarity in levels.
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Figure 4: 52-week Rolling Correlation of WTI and Brent Weekly Spot Prices
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Source: Data obtained from United States Energy Information Administration.
Figure 5: WTI and Brent Weekly Spot Prices
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Source: Data obtained from United States Energy Information Administration.
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WTI and Brent, we perform a supremum Wald test for a structural break at an unknown142
break date using symmetric trimming of 15% in the equation143
WTIt = α + βBrentt + ut (1)
where WTIt is the daily spot price of WTI at time t, and Brentt is the daily spot price of144
Brent at time t. Our test finds a breakpoint on January 6, 2011 which is consistent with145
other studies which have identified December 2010 as the date of a structural break in the146
WTI-Brent price spread (Bu¨yu¨ksahin et al., 2013, Chen, Huang and Yi, 2015, Ye and Karali,147
2016) and in WTI-Brent cointegration (Chen, Huang and Yi, 2015).148
To more formally test for a breakdown in the cointegration between these series, we149
repeat the Engle-Granger cointegration test for the periods before and after the breakpoint.150
We find strong evidence of cointegration between WTI and Brent in the period before the151
January 6, 2011 breakpoint and we fail to reject the hypothesis of no cointegration in the152
period after the breakpoint, at the 1% significance level. Test statistics for the stationarity153
and cointegration tests for the pre- and post-breakpoint periods are presented in Table 2.154
As a robustness check, we test for a structural break in the cointegration of Brent and WTI155
daily spot prices using the Gregory-Hansen test (Gregory and Hansen, 1996). We perform156
the Gregory-Hansen test on Equation 1 allowing for structural change in the level and slope157
of the cointegrating relationship and reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in favor158
of a structural break on January 10, 2011 at the 1% significance level.159
Turning to the futures market, the 52-week rolling correlation between the front160
month WTI and Brent future prices is reported in Figure 6 and for the fourth month in161
Figure 7. We find statistical evidence of a structural break in the relationship between the162
WTI and Brent front month futures prices on January 6, 2011 as well as between the fourth163
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Table 2: Tests for Stationarity and Cointegration
Test Pre-Breakpoint Post-Breakpoint
WTI Stationarity -2.263 -0.830
Brent Stationarity -1967 -0.664
WTI-Brent Cointegration -8.066** -2.650
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Stationarity and cointegration tests are conducted on daily WTI and Brent spot prices per the Energy
Information Administration (EIA, 2016d). The Pre-Breakpoint time period is December 17, 1993 to
January 5, 2011 and the Post-Breakpoint time period is January 7, 2011 to February 26, 2016. Test
statistics reported above are the results of DF-GLS tests allowing for a trend and including lag terms as
specified by the Schwarz Criterion. The results are preserved under alternative choices of lag length and
restrictions on trend.
month futures prices on January 25, 2011.5164
3. What drives the new price structure?165
We hypothesize that the reason behind the breakdown of the correlation between166
the spot prices, the futures prices, and the inter-temporal spreads was a result of both supply167
shocks and barriers to arbitrage. The U.S. had been a significant importer of crude oil, but168
reliance on imports (particularly imports from the North Sea region) was greatly diminished169
post-2010. The U.S. experienced a strong positive supply shock and inventory buildup at170
the same time that Europe was experiencing negative supply shocks and inventory depletion.171
Additionally, as indicated in Bu¨yu¨ksahin et al. (2013) and Ye and Karali (2016), the U.S.172
and EU also experienced shocks to demand at this time. The reweighting of the commodity173
indices S&P GSCI and the Dow Jones UBS served to increase demand for Brent at the174
expense of reduced demand for WTI. Further, increased Japanese oil demand following the175
Fukushima disaster served to increase demand for Brent to replace lost nuclear electricity176
generation. The shocks in demand experienced by the U.S. and the EU impact the spot177
5We estimate structural breaks for the front and fourth month contracts using the supremum Wald test for
a structural break at an unknown break date using symmetric trimming of 15%. The front month structural
break and fourth month structural break are also statistically significant at the <0.0001% level.
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Figure 6: 52-week Rolling Correlation of WTI and Brent Weekly Front Month
Futures Prices
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Note: Dashed line indicates January 6, 2011.
Source: Data obtained from Quandl.com.
Figure 7: 52-week Rolling Correlation of WTI and Brent Weekly Fourth
Month Futures Prices
0
.5
1
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Date
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Source: Data obtained from Quandl.com.
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price, futures price, and inter-temporal spread relationships in the same direction as the178
supply shocks. That is, the negative demand shock experienced by the U.S. exacerbates the179
impact of the positive supply shock on the futures pricing relationship. For the EU, the180
positive demand shock exacerbates the impact of the negative supply shock. In Section 5.1,181
we describe an alternative specification of our competitive storage model where we implement182
structural change in the form of demand shifts rather than supply shifts and our results are183
robust to this change in specification.184
The supply shocks in the U.S. and EU oil markets resulted in the price of WTI185
falling below the price of Brent by an amount that far exceeded shipping costs of about $2186
per barrel (Scheid, 2014). The average price difference between 2000 and 2010 had WTI at a187
premium of $1.40 per bbl. The price difference between WTI and Brent reached the extreme188
of WTI at a discount of $29.59 per bbl on September 23, 2011. However, due to the U.S.189
crude oil export ban, this price difference was not arbitraged away. Traders were unable to190
move oil from the United States to Europe or elsewhere to correct the price differential which191
lasted until 2015. As a consequence of the unexpected positive oil supply shocks in the U.S.,192
storage capacity in Cushing, OK reached its maximum. One curious element of the steep193
contango in the United States is that with the relatively new production boom in historically194
non-producing regions (e.g. North Dakota) why would these producers not simply ”store”195
their oil in place rather than extract and deliver into a market that indicate higher prices196
would await in a few months time. Nevertheless, these producers in these regions did extract197
their oil during despite facing a steep contango. When there is no opportunity to put oil into198
storage, it creates pressure to sell immediately thus driving down the spot price relative to199
the futures price. The contrary is true of the Brent market; as unexpected supply disruptions200
persisted and continued to draw down inventories, this put upward pressure on the spot price201
of oil relative to the futures prices. We theorize that had there been no export ban, or if the202
U.S. had plenty of excess storage capacity and Europe had plenty of crude oil in storage, the203
integration of the two markets would have persisted.204
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4. A stylized model of world oil prices205
As Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) employed the competitive storage model to206
reproduce the stylized facts of autocorrelation and price spikes in commodity prices, we207
employ the competitive storage model to reproduce the Brent-WTI oil market pricing struc-208
ture linked by trade. As in Miranda and Glauber (1995), we conceptualize a two-region209
oil market allowing competitive interregional trade, competitive storage, lagged production210
decisions and uncertain output and prices. While a two-region model is a simplification of211
the complex geography of the world oil market, this representation is useful in isolating the212
impacts of barriers to spatial and inter-temporal arbitrage. Since models of trade and storage213
under uncertainty do not have analytical solutions (Gustafson, 1958, Deaton and Laroque,214
1992, Miranda and Glauber, 1995, Gardner, 1979), we solve and simulate the competitive215
storage model numerically using the Rational Expectations Complementarity Solver created216
by Christophe Gouel (2012). In order to capture the nature of the oil market at the time of217
the market pricing anomaly, we impose the restriction on trade that United States may not218
export oil and we impose constraints on storage such that storage levels may not fall below219
zero or exceed some maximum capacity specific to each region. For each region i = 1, 2 and220
period t, market price is denoted by Pi,t, planned production by Hi,t, ending stocks by Si,t,221
consumption by Ci,t, exports from region i by Xi,t and the discount rate is denoted by r. The222
quantity of oil available in each region at the beginning of each period, Ai,t, is equal to the223
ending stocks of last period plus current production which is determined by a multiplicative,224
exogenous shock, ei,t, on a production decision last period:225
Ai,t = Si,t−1 +Hi,tei,t. (2)
Available oil at the beginning of the period plus current period imports must equal226
current period consumption plus ending stocks plus current period exports:227
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Ai,t +X∼i,t = Ci,t + Si,t +Xi,t. (3)
In the above market clearing condition, X∼i,t denotes imports into region i. We228
assume isoelastic demand functions in each region:229
Ci,t = Di × (Pi,t)εi (4)
with demand parameterized by the constants Di and εi. We also assume isoelastic supply230
functions in each region:231
Hi,t = gi ×
(
Et [Pi,t+1ei,t+1]
(1 + r)
)ηi
(5)
with the supply functions parameterized by the constants gi and µi for each region. The232
price of oil in the United States can only exceed the price of oil in Europe by, at most, the233
amount of shipping costs. Therefore, either the WTI minus Brent price spread is less than234
shipping costs or exports from Europe to the U.S. are greater than zero. The spatial arbitrage235
complementary slackness condition is then:236
X2,t ≥ 0 ⊥ P1,t − P2,t ≤ τ, (6)
where τ is the per-barrel shipping cost.6 There is no spatial arbitrage condition allowing for237
trade from the United States to Europe while the crude oil export ban is in place. When the238
ban is lifted, the spatial arbitrage condition for trade from the United States to Europe is239
6The symbol ⊥ indicates that both weak inequalities hold and at least one holds with equality.
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X1,t ≥ 0 ⊥ P2,t − P1,t ≤ τ. (7)
In this model, we have considered linear shipping costs and no transport constraints beyond240
the U.S. export ban, though nonlinear shipping costs and transportation constraints could241
be included.242
Similar to the trade arbitrage condition above, merchants in both markets can store243
crude oil and will do so if the discounted expected price of oil in that market exceeds the244
current price by storage costs within the bounds of minimum, 0, and maximum, S¯i, storage245
levels. The inter-temporal arbitrage complementary slackness conditions are then:246
0 ≤ Si,t ⊥ E [Pi,t+1]
1 + r
− Pi,t ≤ k, (8)
247
Si,t ≤ S¯i ⊥ k ≤ E [Pi,t+1]
1 + r
− Pi,t, (9)
where k is the per-barrel cost of storage.248
The multiplicative, exogenous shocks, ei,t, are assumed to be independent over time249
and across regions and distributed as:250
e1,t
e2,t
 ∼ N (µ,Σ). (10)
We calibrate the model to pre-2011 market conditions characterized by: (1) low variance in251
WTI-Brent spot price spread, (2) WTI price slightly higher than Brent, (3) inter-temporal252
price spreads highly correlated, (4) oil trade in only one direction, and (5) minimum and253
17
maximum storage constraints.7 The parameters are chosen such that the steady-state equi-254
librium values of production, storage, trade, and prices match the mean values for 2008-2011255
time period for each of these regions which are presented in Table 1. We then solve the256
competitive storage model for the decision rules in both the United States and Europe under257
both the presence of the export ban and the absence of the export ban. Choices for parameter258
values are presented in Table 3.259
Table 3: Competitive Storage Model Simulation Parameter Values
Parameter Symbol Value
Per Barrel Storage Cost k 0.06
Per Barrel Shipping Cost τ 5
Supply Elasticity 1 η1 0.2
Supply Coefficient 1 g1 2,201
Supply Elasticity 2 η2 0.2
Supply Coefficient 2 g2 1,550
Demand Elasticity 1 ε1 -0.2
Demand Coefficient 1 D1 12,997
Demand Elasticity 2 ε2 -0.2
Demand Coefficient 2 D2 8,649
Maximum Storage 1 S¯1 73
Maximum Storage 2 S¯2 8.4
Discount Rate r 2%
Mean Shock µ ( 11 )
Shock Covariance Matrix Σ ( 0.025 00 0.025 )
5. Simulation Results260
We simulate the model by setting initial values for the beginning-of-period avail-261
ability, Ai,t, in each region and providing a sequence of random shocks. We generate two262
sequences of random shocks, first selecting 100 random shocks from the distributionN (µ,Σ).8263
Then, to represent the coincident supply shocks of higher than expected production in the264
7Minimum storage constraint is zero in both markets. The maximum level of storage in the United States,
S¯1 = 2, is set to be ten times larger than the maximum level of storage in Europe, S¯2 = 0.2, to reflect actual
market conditions.
8We have also considered specifcations for the covariance matrix which are not symmetric nor independent
and find that these alternate specifications do not affect our results.
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United States and lower than expected production in Europe, we select 150 random shocks265
from the distribution N (µ′,Σ) where µ′ = µ + ( 0.075−0.075 ). That is, starting in period 100 and266
running to the end of the simulation, the mean production shock in the United States is267
increased by 1.5 standard deviations and the mean production shock in Europe is decreased268
by 1.5 standard deviations. Lastly, to illustrate the consequence of the U.S. crude oil export269
ban, beginning at period 150 and running to the end of the simulation, we remove the export270
ban and allow trade to flow from the U.S to the EU. The storage constraints are imposed by271
limiting Si to [0, S¯i] where S¯i < ∞. The export ban is imposed by restricting X1,t = 0 for272
the periods where the export ban is in place, where X1,t is the quantity of exports from the273
U.S. to Europe in time t. The imposition of the shifts in production and lifting the export274
ban partition the sample into three regimes. Regime 1, from period 1 to 100, is considered to275
be the reference case where the production remains unaltered and the export ban is in place.276
Regime 2, from period 101 to 150, has U.S. production elevated and EU production depressed277
along with the export ban in place. Regime 3, from period 151 to 250, has U.S. production278
elevated and EU production depressed along with no restrictions on trade between U.S. and279
the EU.280
Given the initial values for beginning oil availability, decision rules computed in the281
rational expectations model and the production shock series, we simulate the model to solve282
for optimal choice of storage levels and export flows in each region and the model yields spot283
prices and price expectations in each region. We present the simulated storage levels, spot284
prices, export flows, and inter-temporal price spreads in Figure 9.285
From the simulation results, it is apparent that in the first regime, WTI and Brent286
spot prices are highly correlated, as are inter-temporal price spreads. In the second regime,287
however, the elevated production in the United States causes U.S. storage to increase and288
often binds at the maximum storage level. In Europe, the decreased production results in289
decreased storage levels which often bottom out at zero. As these storage markets bind at the290
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Figure 8: Competitive Storage Model - Production Shocks
0 50 100 150 200 250
period
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
Sh
oc
ks
U.S. Europe
Shocks centered about 1 U.S. production shocks elevated
 EU  production shocks depressed
maximum and minimum possible storage levels, the opportunity for inter-temporal arbitrage291
vanishes. Further, exports from Europe to the United States go to zero in period two as292
Europe is experiencing a supply disruption and the spatial arbitrage opportunity in this case293
would be to export oil out of the United States and deliver to Europe.9 Due to the crude oil294
export ban, this was impossible. While U.S. exports of petroleum products (e.g. gasoline,295
diesel, etc.) are permitted, this mode of spatial arbitrage was insufficient to correct the price296
disparity, possibly due to the fact that refinery utilization rates at the WTI delivery point297
were already at 90% and above in 2011.298
In this scenario in which all inter-temporal and spatial methods of arbitrage are299
9Storage and export levels reaching zero is a limitation of the modeling framework. In practice, storage
levels do not typically reach zero as there are physical requirements on minimum storage levels for floating
roof style storage facilities as well as storage amounts held for operational reasons. In terms of exports, there
are several possible reasons why EU producers would continue to ship oil to the U.S. even if the arbitrage
conditions suggest they would be doing so at a loss. One possibility is that EU producers might have long-
term contracts with U.S. buyers. Nevertheless, the general result of EU storage levels and exports decreasing
substantially is consistent with the observed stylized facts.
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Figure 9: Simulation Results - Price, Storage, Exports, Spread, & Production
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Note: Regime 1 is the reference case where production is unaltered and the export ban is in place. Regime 2
has U.S. production elevated, EU production depressed, and the export ban in place. Regime 3 has U.S.
production elevated, EU production depressed, and no export ban. Price is in USD per barrel, storage is in
millions of barrels, exports are in thousands of barrels per day, spread is in USD per barrel, and production
is in thousands of barrels per day.
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unavailable, the spot prices of these near identical grades of crude separate. The price in the300
United States falls, the price in Europe rises and the inter-temporal spreads in these regions301
take on opposite shapes. The simulation results replicate the situation where the WTI price302
is lower than Brent, WTI is in contango, Brent is in backwardation, U.S stocks reach the303
maximum, European stocks are drawn down to the minimum, and trade from Europe to the304
U.S goes to zero.305
In the third regime where U.S. production is elevated, EU production depressed,306
and no export ban, the U.S. is able to take advantage of the spatial arbitrage opportunity.307
Following the repeal of the export ban, the simulation indicates oil flowing from the U.S. to308
the EU, storage levels falling in the U.S., storage levels climbing in the EU, and prices and309
price spreads converging back together.310
5.1. Robustness Check311
We consider the scenario where instead of a structural change in supply, we im-312
plement a structural shift in demand. Our original specification implements the structural313
change in supply by shifting the means of the multiplicative supply shocks in Equation 10314
from µ to µ′. In this specification, we leave the mean of the shock distribution constant315
at µ and shift out the EU demand and shift in the U.S. demand, reflecting the change in316
demand due to the reweighting of commodity indices and the increase in Japanese demand.317
Simulating the model under this alternate specification yields equivalent results in terms318
of separation of spot prices, cessation of international trade, hitting storage maximum and319
minimum levels, and yielding opposite price spreads during the period where the structural320
change is implemented and the export ban is in place.321
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6. Conclusion322
The WTI and Brent contracts compete for the role as the world benchmark price323
of oil. Traders, including hedgers, typically choose one or the other contract. This means324
there is great interest in the WTI-Brent pricing structure, including the shape of the two325
futures curves, the absolute price difference between the two benchmarks, and the dynamics326
of the degree of integration of the markets. These markets are heavily traded (directly327
and indirectly) by hedgers and financial investors. Prices of jet fuel, heating oil, diesel, and328
gasoline follow these markets closely. And there are also a large number of derivative financial329
products such as swaps and options based on either WTI or Brent, or based on the price330
spread between them.331
From early 2011, the price of WTI went to a significant discount to Brent, but332
U.S. crude could not be exported to the world market to arbitrage away the spread. This333
break in the pricing relationship arose largely because of expanded U.S. production, reduced334
production of Brent, and storage capacity factors. For similar reasons, the shape of the two335
futures curves diverged around the same time. WTI was in contango and Brent displayed336
backwardation. We develop a simulation model that explains the change in the pricing337
structure in 2011. The key stylized facts of the WTI and Brent pricing structure are replicated338
with our model. This means the break in the WTI-Brent futures pricing structure can be339
explained by standard commodity storage theory.340
Since the break in the WTI-Brent relationship, a number of fundamental changes341
have occurred in the U.S. crude oil infrastructure. In May 2012, a major pipeline connecting342
the WTI terminal in Cushing, OK to the Gulf Coast reversed it flow direction allowing crude343
to be sent from the WTI terminal to the coast. In December 2015, U.S. Congress lifted344
the crude oil export ban. Given that the barriers to spatial arbitrage in the WTI-Brent345
market have been lifted, the 2011 market segmentation in the crude oil market is unlikely to346
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reoccur. As a result, the arguments for abandoning WTI as the main crude benchmark have347
been corrected, and the arguments against using Brent as the main global crude benchmark348
remain.349
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